Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of network communication technology, network steganography which uses redundancies in protocols to transfer secret information has attracted lots of attentions of researchers. Network steganography is also named network covert channel which can be divided into two kinds-covert storage channel and covert timing one [1] . The first is to embed the message bits into the packet header field or the payload. The second is to encode the information by changing the packet transmission rate or the packet time delays. The early network steganography [2, 3, 4, 5] utilized the unused field in TCP/IP header to transmit covert message. The kind of methods is simple but cannot avoid the pattern of the normal packets being modification. It is easy to make the reliable detection by checking the pattern such as the progressive increase of IPID filed, all zeros in the default extended field of TCP etc. Hence, the researchers have to develop new methods.
For example, Ji [6] et al. proposed a method which used different packet lengths to transmit covert messages and made the distribution of packet lengths near to the normal one as close as possible. Szczypiorski [7] et al. proposed a method to use VoIP (voice over internet protocol) packets as carriers to transmit covert messages.
In their method, the sender delays some packets intentionally and the receiver distinguishes these packets from network traffic and picks up covert messages. Yao [8] et al. proposed an ON/OFF covert timing channel which could make the distribution of the covert time delays close to that of the overt ones. Gianvecchio [9] et al. proposed a covert timing channel based on the model of normal time intervals. Liu [10] et al. proposed a simple but efficient covert timing channel with distribution matching. Those methods mentioned above Those methods mentioned above represent the main direction to design more secure and stealthy network steganography through preventing the statistics of the covert network packets not or less being changed. However, the covert communication rate of those methods is still very low. In [11] , Szczypiorski et al. proposed a retransmission-based steganography (RSTEG). The authors argued that retransmissions caused by network overload, excessive delays or reordering packets accounted for about 7% in total Internet packets [12, 13, 14] . By replacing the payload field of those retransmitted packets, RSTEG can achieve higher capacity than the traditional methods.
Because the checksum of the retransmitted packet generated by RSTEG is different from that of the original packet, one can make the detection just by comparing the captured retransmitted checksum with that of the recoded one. So, we make an improvement on RSTEG based on payload compensation, which can counter the checksum-comparison-based detection method. Further, a more efficient detection method based on payload segment comparison is proposed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related work. Section 3 introduces the improved RSTEG (IRSTEG) algorithm and its detection method. Section 4 gives experimental results and corresponding analysis. Section 5 concludes the whole paper.
II. RELATED WORK Figure 1 The communication process illustration of RSTEG based on TCP timed-out
A. Principle of RSTEG
The communication process of RSTEG based on TCP time-out is illustrated in Fig.1 . In the process, despite that the receiver gets a segment successfully, the ACK packet is not sent intentionally. If the sender doesn't receive the ACK packet within a fixed time, the last packet will be retransmitted. In the retransmission step, the payload field of the retransmitted packet is replaced by the covert message bits. When the receiver gets the retransmitted packet, he can obtain the covert messages and send ACK packet back. In [11] , the authors also give some other retransmission-based methods which are similar to this one, and the main difference is just the retransmission condition. So here we only discuss RSTEG based on TCP time-out.
B. Detection Methods against RSTEG
Based on the characteristics of RSTEG, we think that there are three potential methods that can be used to make detection. The first method is based on retransmission probability check which was also mentioned in [11] . The basic philosophy is that if the retransmission probability is larger than a fixed threshold such as 7%, the traffic will be judged abnormal. It may be efficient for RSTEG using a larger retransmission probability, but will be invalid when the retransmission probability is set blow the detection threshold.
The second method is based on the direct payload comparison. The detection process is that when a TCP retransmission is observed, the payload fields of the original and the retransmission packet are compared. If they are same, the retransmission will be considered abnormal, else it will be considered normal. The method needs large cache space because all packets without being acknowledged should be stored beforehand. For example, suppose that the speed of one TCP link is 50 packets per second with each packet length sized 1500B, the retransmission probability is 5% and the number of TCP links in the gateway is 200. As the TCP window size is 16 bit, the maximum receive number of one TCP link is 65535B. It is to say that an ACK packet will be returned every 43 packets. If the payload comparison method is used, there are totally about 2GB ( (50 43) 1500 200 − × × ) memory is needed per second. It must bring about the burden of store and computation.
The last method is based on the comparison of TCP checksum values. It is known that after the original packet payload is replaced, the TCP checksum will be recalculated to keep the legality of the new packet. Generally, the new checksum is different from the original one with a very high probability. So if we just store the original checksum fields and make the comparison when retransmission occurs, the store cost will be reduced to a more allowable level than the second method. Taking the case mentioned in the second method for example, there are only about 2.73MB cache per second.
According to the above analysis, we can see that RSTEG is not stealthy enough. To make RSTEG be able to resist the checksum comparison detection method, the improvement should be made. It will be discussed in the following section.
III. IMPROVED RSTEG AND ITS DETECTION

A. Improved RSTEG
The communication framework of IRSTEG is shown in Fig.2 . IRSTEG mainly contains three parts: Embedder, Compenastor and Filter. Embedder is used to embed covert messages into the normal traffic, and Compensator is responsible for compensating the TCP checksum field. Filter is used by the receiver to identify the packets that carry covert messages.
The communication process of IRSTEG is mainly consisted of four steps:
Step1: Embedder replaces the packet payload by covert message bits.
Step2: Compenastor to make the checksum field of the modified packet same with that of the original un-modified packet by the compensation algorithm described in Section 3.2.
Step3: The modified and compensated packet is sent to the receiver.
Step4: The receiver uses Filter to identify the covert packets and extract the covert message from the payload field. 
B.Compensation Algorithm
To begin with the discussion of the compensation algorithm, a brief introduction about TCP checksum calculation rule is given which is defined by RFC793 document in detailed. The checksum field is a 16 bit one's complement of the one's complement sum of all 16 bit words in the header and text. If a segment contains an odd number of header and text octets to be checksummed, the last octet is padded on the right with zeros to form a 16 bit word for checksum purposes. The padding is not transmitted as part of the segment. The pseudo-header is only used in calculating checksum value, whose format is shown in Fig.3 .
Theorem1: For two TCP packets with the same header except the checksum field, despite their payload fields are different, the TCP checksum also can be made the same by at most 16 bit word compensation in payload field.
Prove: Suppose f Σ indicates the sum of all elements in the set f of 16 bit words. As the sum may exceed the capacity of a 16 bit word, we will express this sum as in terms of two 16 bit words, a and b . First, the sum of all 16 bit words in f is expressed in the form 16 2 f a b Σ = + (1) the notation ~f means to get the compliment of the integer value f with trimming to a maximum width of 16 bits. As the TCP checksum mentioned above, it can be expressed as:
Assume the payload field of one TCP packet p is x , and the payload field of packet q is y . q is the retransmitted packet of p . An example is given to illustrate the above compensation algorithm. Frame 0030 (Fig.4.a) is a normal packet in network, and Frame 0031 (Fig.4.b) is its retransmission packet. The bold italic characteristics in 
C. Detecting IRSTEG by Payload Segment Comparison
It is discussed above that there are three detection algorithms against RSTEG. Through the simple analysis, it is not hard to find that the first and third methods are not valid for IRSTEG. The second method does still work without considering the huge storing demand of the detector. To reduce the storing demand, we propose to make the detection by comparing some randomly-selected payload segments. For example, for a TCP packet, only ten Bytes from its payload field are selected from the pseudo-random position which is determined by a pseudo-random number generator(PRNG). According to the instinctive consideration, the chosen ten Bytes will be different with a very high probability. Despite that the proposed method can't guarantee 100% correction rate, it also can give a reliable detection results with the demand of cache storing greatly less than that of the original second method.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Environmental Environment
The experiments are carried out in two different network conditions. One is China Education and Research Network (CERNET) and the other is China Telecom Network (CTN). CERNET is constructed to connect most of universities and institutes in P. R. China and CTN provides the public Internet access service as the largest commercial ISP in P. R. China. The IRSTEG receiver is laid in CERNET of Nanjing University of Science and Technology with an independent IPv4 address. The IRSTEG sender is laid in CERNET and CTN network respectively. For shorting and distinguishing, the two network conditions are called CE-CE and CT-CE respectively. The hardware condition of the sender and receiver are same, which is shown in Table I . The operating system of the sender and receiver are Windows XP sp3 and Windows Server 2003 respectively. The sending and receiving software are both realized by Visual C++. The overt flows are generated by uploading files to a FTP server which is installed in the receiver computer. The uploading speed is set to 200KB/s and the whole payload length is set to 1460B (reserve 2 Bytes for making compensation). In our experiments, the retransmission probability is set to 5% artificially. In Table II , five time experiments are listed and the average transfer speeds are shown similar between CE-CE and CT-CE. It is because the uploading speed of the two network conditions is same.
B. Detection Results
Assume that the correct detection rate as DR. It depends on the comparison amount (CA) and embedding amount (EA) of IRSTEG. Here, CA is the selected byte amount. EA is the byte amount that the sender embeds. The detection algorithm base on the payload segment comparison is tested by total 10,000 times with different EA and CA. The average DR is calculated. Fig.5 shows the detection results under different CA and EA. From  Fig.5 , it can be seen that with the increase of EA and CA, the detection result becomes more and more reliable.
From Fig.5 , it can be seen that when CA is kept invariable and EA increases, the DR will also increase along with EA. When CA equals to 25B and EA equals to 200B, DR is as high as 98.3%. The more detailed experimental results are listed in Table III . It can be seen that when EA is larger than 150B, the detection method can achieve pretty results with less CA. At the situation, IRSTEG is not stealthy so far. Thus, if we want to keep stealthy of IRSTEG, EA should keep in a suitable low level. According to the results in Table III , when CA is set to 40B, EA should be set to less than 35B to guarantee that DR is less than 60%. It explains that despite the proposed method can detect IRSTEG, the sender can still avoid being detected by lowering down the covert communication speed. V. CONCLUSIONS Different from the network steganographic methods which use the packet fields, RSTEG make the covert communication by replacing the retransmitted packet payload. It make RSTEG has very high covert communication rate. In this paper, we give three methods to make detection of RSTEG. In them, the detection method based on the checksum comparison is must efficient. To resist it, an improved RSTEG is presented by the payload compensation. Further, we give a detection scheme based on payload segment comparison which is reformed from the direct payload comparison. The experimental results show that the proposed method can make reliable detection against IRSTEG and the sender have to lower the covert communication speed to enhance its stealthy.
